On July 8, 2026, the staff (the “Staff”) of the Division of Corporation Finance (the “Division”) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) issued a no-action letter (the “No-Action Letter”) in response to an incoming letter submitted on behalf of UBS Group AG (the “Incoming Letter”), addressing the application of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 (as amended, the “Securities Act”) to the exchange or conversion of certain debt securities subject to the Swiss bail-in framework.
The Incoming Letter sought the Staff’s confirmation that the Staff would not recommend the SEC take enforcement action in the event that the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (“FINMA”), the Swiss resolution authority, ordered a conversion of UBS Group AG’s (“UBS”) bail-in debt securities into new equity securities of UBS, pursuant to Swiss bail-in legislation.
Bail-in securities are a type of financial instrument that qualifies as regulatory capital and are issued by bank holding companies or banks. Depending on the specific resolution scheme applicable to such securities, should the bank issuing such securities fail or become likely to fail, the prudential regulator or banking agency with resolution authority (in this case FINMA) may exercise its bail-in powers (in combination with other resolution tools) to write down or convert, directly or indirectly, such bank’s bail-in securities, and if needed, other unsecured liabilities of the failed institution, into equity or other securities (such process, a “Bail-In”). Bail-Ins are intended to allow a resolution authority to recapitalize a failing financial institution without relying on taxpayer funds. UBS cited an earlier no-action letter from April 2026 in response to the Bank of England’s application relating to the exchange of certain debt securities under a UK-bail scenario, which we covered in a prior blog post.
Similar to the April 2026 no-action letter, the Division stated in the present No-Action Letter, that such an exchange of securities constitutes an “offer” and “sale” of securities within the meaning of Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act, but the Division will not take enforcement action in reliance on the opinion of applicant’s counsel that the Securities Act Section 3(a)(9) exemption is available.
Swiss Bail-In Framework
Pursuant to the bank resolution and restructuring regime of Switzerland, FINMA may only order a Bail-In if it determines that the financial institution, in this case UBS, has reached the point of “Insolvenzgefahr” (non-viability) pursuant to Article 25(1) of the Swiss Banking Act. Once FINMA determines an issuer has reached “non-viability,” FINMA would be authorized to order the full write-down or conversion of such issuer’s outstanding securities, including such issuer’s additional Tier 1 debt securities and Tier 2 debt securities in accordance with the contractual terms of these securities. Following this write-down or conversion, the conversion Order would require the subsequent full reduction and/or cancellation of the issuer’s outstanding equity securities. FINMA cannot order a Bail-In unless the resolution: (1) is based on a prudent valuation of the bank’s assets and liabilities along with a prudent estimate of the restructuring requirements, (2) is deemed not to be economically worse for creditors than the immediate initiation of insolvency proceedings, (3) takes into account the priority of creditors’ interests over those of the owners and the ranking of creditors appropriately and (4) adequately considers the legal and economic interconnection between assets, liabilities and contractual relationships. In addition, the Swiss Banking Act addresses the sequence in which a write down or debt-to-equity conversion would occur in the event of Bail-in.
The request for relief set forth in the Incoming Letter was premised upon a direct conversion of the Bail-In securities into new equity securities of UBS Group AG as contemplated by the Swiss Banking Act, without the use of interim instruments. This process is distinct from the bail-in mechanism addressed in the Bank of England’s No-Action Letter, whereby holders of the bail-in securities would be granted contingent beneficial interests known as “PROPPs” instead of being directly converted into news equity securities of the post-resolution entity. However, similar to the PROPPs, there would be no additional consideration paid by holders of bail-in securities in connection with a Bail-In.
Section 3(a)(9) Exemption Applies
Section 3(a)(9) exempts from registration “any security exchanged by the issuer with its existing security holders exclusively where no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly by or indirectly for soliciting such exchange.” UBS was of the opinion that the conditions for reliance on Section 3(a)(9) would be met in connection with the above-described Swiss Bail-In resolution mechanism. The Staff concluded that it would not recommend enforcement action if UBS, upon reaching non-viability and in reliance on an opinion of counsel that the exemption provided in Section 3(a)(9) is available, was directed by FINMA to convert its bail-in securities directly into new equity securities of UBS. The Staff also noted that UBS would remain the issuer of the new equity securities issued upon such Bail-In conversion. This new no-action letter provides greater clarity on the SEC’s position relating to the applicability of the Section 3(a)(9) exemption in the case of a bail-in of a Swiss financial institution, especially since the failure of Credit Suisse (a Swiss financial institution) had precipitated questions on the applicability of Section 3(a)(9).




